

GRU

From: NEW YORK

To: MOSCOW

No. 938

17 June 1943

To the Director.

I am transmitting the main points of a report of BEW[1] (compiled in April) reviewing the evaluation of the American and British Intelligence Services of the forces in the Soviet-German front in 1943 (the report was given by MARQUIS[MARKIZ][11] from ARTHUR[ARTUR][111]):

1. The main conclusion in the [C% report]

[28 groups unrecoverable]

2. The evaluation of the British Intelligence Service:

The ground and air forces of the USSR considerably exceed the German. The USSR's production of tanks and aircraft exceeds by far the German. The economic and possibly the military potential of the USSR have not reached their peak, but the German is on the decline. On the front by March there were 258 Soviet divisions, German (in the equivalent) 168-178, not considering Rumanian and others. Aircraft correspondingly 4,888-4,588 and 1,688.

3. [The evaluation][a] of the American [Intelligence Service][a]:

"It is inadequately defined: all the German losses on the front will be replaced by summer; by [C% 1 June of this year] 38-48 new divisions will be formed and trained. The aim of the Germans in 1943 is as before - the destruction of the Red Army in offensive operations."

4. The BEW's own conclusions:

a) British Intelligence grossly exaggerates the Russian forces and underestimates the German forces, but the Americans do the opposite.

b) A full-scale offensive by the Germans is beyond the limits of their possibilities. At the same time the economy of the USSR is so strained that the armed forces cannot be, from the point of view of ability to conduct operations, at the 1942 level for more than a year.

c) In the summer the Russians will have considerable superiority on the ground and undisputed mastery in the air.

d) The superiority of the Germans is in transport both in the rear and along the front for regrouping.

e) If by the summer Germany can replace all her losses and there will be no risk in weakening her garrisons in Europe, she can launch an offensive on a scale almost equal to that of 1942. The German Command probably would not consider advantageous a transition to defense on all fronts. Their main task in 1943 will [C% therefore] be the destruction of the armed strength of the USSR.

f) The ability of the Russians to withstand for a long time  
the impact

[43 groups unrecoverable]

No. 169

MOLIERE[MOL'ER][iv]

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Notes: [a] Inserted by translator.

Comments:

[1] BEW: Board of Economic Warfare.

[ii] MARKIZ: Joseph Milton BERNSTEIN.

[iii] ARTUR: Thomas Arthur BISSON.

[iv] MOL'ER: Pavel P. MIKHAILOV.

15 April 1968